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ExECUTIvE SUMMARy
There are 89 States and territories that have 
some form of current or historical interest 
in the tropical tuna fisheries (i.e., bigeye, 
yellowfin, and skipjack) of the Western and 
Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO).1 However, 
only 14 of them ultimately control access 
to the most productive fishing grounds and 
the vessels that fish in them. All but one of 
these States are full members of the Western 
and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission 
(WCPFC), and all have some form of vested 
interest in the long-term sustainability of 
some part of the tropical tuna fisheries.
14 States or territories control 
access to the most productive 
tuna fishing grounds in the world. 
Understanding their interests is 
essential to driving successful 
conservation and management 
outcomes at WCPFC.
This paper studies the mix of interests in the 
WCPO tropical tuna fisheries. These interests 
are likely to influence each delegation’s national 
interest and drive negotiating positions to 
support or oppose certain measures, depending 
upon how they affect that State’s interests. 
Given the complex nature of the WCPO tuna 
fisheries and their conservation challenges, it 
is important to understand these interests and 
consider how States might compromise their 
interests in an equitable manner that allows 
for the adoption of a new conservation and 
management measure for tropical tuna.
The largest markets in the world for fresh, 
frozen, smoked, and canned tuna are the 
United States, Japan, and Europe.2 All of 
these markets, to some degree, depend upon 
the WCPO tuna fisheries for their supply. 
In addition, markets in developing States 
are looking towards domestically produced 
and imported canned tuna to counter food 
insecurity and as a cheap form of protein.3 In 
this context, conservation and management 
decisions within the WCPFC, particularly in 
regard to skipjack and purse-seine fisheries, 
can quickly affect global markets and have 
significant repercussions on prices.4
The WCPFC faces an increasingly complex and 
urgent challenge. The scientific assessments 
clearly indicate that urgent action is required 
to address overfishing and reduce fishing 
mortality for bigeye, halt any increases in 
fishing mortality for yellowfin, reduce fishing 
mortality of juvenile bigeye and yellowfin, 
and develop precautionary limits for skipjack. 
Despite its mandate, the WCPFC has repeatedly 
failed to adopt conservation and management 
measures that are sufficient to meet its own 
Scientific Committee’s recommendations. 
The conservation challenge is complicated by 
the multigear, multispecies, and multinational 
characteristics of the WCPO tropical tuna 
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fisheries. Skipjack, yellowfin, and bigeye are all 
caught by each gear in a tightly intermeshed 
manner that is difficult, if not impossible, 
to separate. Consequently, the fishery is 
inherently challenging to manage. This 
complexity is exacerbated by the substantially 
different biological characteristics of skipjack, 
yellowfin, and bigeye (i.e., highly resilient and 
productive skipjack compared to the longer-
lived and less-productive bigeye). Further, 
since the mid-1990s, various studies have 
suggested that the profitability of the WCPO 
tuna fisheries could be increased through 
significant changes in fleet composition 
and reductions in total fishing effort.5
For the WCPFC to resolve  
the threat to bigeye, it must limit 
longline catches and restrict the 
operation of purse-seine vessels 
that are targeting highly productive 
skipjack that are not currently 
threatened by overfishing.
For the WCPFC to resolve the threat to bigeye, 
it must limit longline catches and restrict 
the operation of purse-seine vessels that 
are targeting highly productive skipjack that 
are not currently threatened by overfishing. 
However, purse-seine fleets will receive 
little or no long-term sustainability benefit 
or increase in profitability if bigeye stocks 
rebuild. Longline fleets will directly benefit 
from conservation measures that rebuild 
bigeye stocks, thus increasing profits by 
improving catch per unit of effort (CPUE).
Figures 1 through 4 (immediately following 
executive summary) illustrate the fisheries 
interests of all States that reported catches 
between 2008 and 2010. The proportion of 
their benefit from each species and gear is 
charted horizontally, based on the value of 
the catch taken by their registered vessels or 
from waters under their national jurisdiction. 
Figure 1 illustrates the balance of interests for 
coastal States from skipjack to bigeye, while 
Figure 2 does the same for flag States. Figure 
3 illustrates the balance of interests for coastal 
States from purse seine to longline, while 4 
does the same for flag States.  
From this analysis, the following interests can 
be identified: 
 Seven of the core 14 States can be loosely 
referred to as ‘purse-seine/skipjack States’, 
six of which are part of the group of coastal 
States that dominate the control of the most 
productive purse-seine fishing grounds 
(Papua New Guinea, Kiribati, Tuvalu, Nauru, 
Federated States of Micronesia, and the 
Solomon Islands). These six States enjoy 
far greater benefits from the WCPO skipjack 
fisheries (compared to bigeye and yellowfin), 
purse-seine fisheries (compared to longline 
and other gears), and licensing revenue for 
access to their exclusive economic zones 
(EEZs) (compared to their vessel registry 
interests). These six States also have strong 
interests in the welfare of their artisanal 
coastal communities and aspirations to 
develop and expand their participation in the 
WCPO tuna fisheries.  
 The seventh of the purse-seine/skipjack States 
is the United States. The United States is 
dominated by its vessel registry interests, 
which provide more than 80% of the benefits 
that the United States enjoys from the WCPO 
tuna fisheries (compared to the catch from 
within its EEZ). Although far less significant in 
the context of its overall interest, the United 
States catches substantial amounts of bigeye 
through its Hawaiian longline fisheries. As 
an established distant water fishing nation 
(DWFN), the United States has a strong 
interest in protecting its historical level of 
activity. The significance of its distant water 
fleet also gives the United States an interest 
in distributing the burden of conservation 
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across all waters of the WCPO without special 
regard for EEZs or archipelagic waters. 
 The remaining seven core States have fishing 
interests across multiple gears, mostly 
longline and purse seine. They are Japan, the 
Philippines, Indonesia, Chinese Taipei, South 
Korea, China, and the Marshall Islands. These 
States must balance the costs and benefits 
of conservation measures across their own 
domestic interests when considering how 
best to address conservation challenges. 
These tensions are further complicated by 
broader interests held by Indonesia, the 
Philippines, and Japan in pole and line and 
other gears. 
 The European Union has a critical market 
interest and a far less significant distant 
water fishing interest. Nevertheless, its 
limited fishing interest in the WCPO tropical 
tuna fisheries appears to be dominated by 
purse-seine fleets that are highly dependent 
on fish aggregating devices (FADs). The EU 
does not represent any significant coastal 
State interests (the Pacific island territories 
of France and the United Kingdom are not 
represented by the EU). Consequently, the EU 
has an interest in supporting measures that 
distribute the burden of conservation across 
all waters of the WCPO without special regard 
for coastal State interests or development 
aspirations. Japan and the United States are 
also critical market States for the WCPO tuna 
fisheries but must balance these interests 
with significant distant water fishing interests 
and coastal interests.
In addition, the positions of those coastal 
States with mixed interests in multiple 
gears and species are further complicated 
by their significant flag State interests. This 
is particularly a challenge for Indonesia and 
the Philippines, which have extensive vessel 
interests that extend into the high seas. This 
significantly undermines any motivation that 
these States may have in supporting high 
seas closures or conservation measures that 
prioritise conservation reductions on the high 
seas over waters under national jurisdictions. 
Given current levels of overfishing, a 
sustainable solution for bigeye will require 
that some or all States compromise their 
interests and carry some of the conservation 
burden. This raises important questions 
that are fundamental to conservation and 
management negotiations. It is arguable 
that overfishing of bigeye will continue 
until the WCPFC negotiates a measure that 
transparently recognises the benefits and 
costs, and equitably distributes the burden of 
conservation in a manner consistent with the 
WCPF Convention. It appears unlikely that the 
WCPFC will be able to develop and negotiate 
such a response across its plenary table without 
first agreeing on some form of framework for 
distributing the conservation burden. This 
framework will need to allow for a differential 
application of measures that recognises the 
divergent interests while allowing for sufficient 
reductions in fishing mortality. This should be 
within the limits set by precautionary reference 
points and guided by agreed harvest control 
rules that recognise the need to equitably 
distribute the burden of conservation. 
Consequently, this paper suggests that the 
WCPFC should prioritise the adoption of target 
and limit reference points, and establish a new 
‘discussion’ on how to resolve the distribution 
of the conservation burden. This paper 
suggests that ultimately the WCPFC should 
establish a transparent framework that defines 
the parameters and values for how it distributes 
the conservation burden. This framework 
should necessarily balance the interests of its 
members in a politically acceptable manner that 
is in accordance with international principles 
and standards relating to conservation and 
sustainable development.
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FIGURE 1.  Scale of Interests for Coastal States: From Bigeye to Skipjack (average 2008–2010)
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FIGURE 4.  Scale of Interests for Flag States: From Purse Seine to Longline (average 2008–2010)
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FIGURE 3.  Scale of Interests for Coastal States: From Purse Seine to Longline (average 2008–2010)
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INTRODUCTION
“The first instinct of most governments in the international arena  
is to protect and promote their own national interests.”6
        u.S. Ambassador david Balton 
                                                                                                                      Deputy Assistant Secretary of State 
                                                                                                                      for Oceans and Fisheries
The Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO) 
stretches approximately 6,000 nautical miles, 
from the archipelagos of Southeast Asia to the 
remote atolls of Kiribati in the Central Pacific. 
This vast ocean is home to the world’s most 
productive tuna fisheries, supplying global 
markets with skipjack, bigeye, yellowfin and 
albacore worth approximately US$4.6 billion.7 
These fisheries are critically different from other 
tuna fisheries in that 87% of all reported WCPO 
tuna catches are harvested from waters under 
national jurisdiction.8 Unlike the high seas tuna 
fisheries of the Eastern Pacific, Indian Ocean 
and North Atlantic, the WCPO tuna fisheries 
are predominantly owned by a small group of 
developing coastal States. 
In December 2004, the region came together 
and celebrated the establishment of the 
Western and Central Pacific Fisheries 
Commission (WCPFC) in Pohnpei, Federated 
States of Micronesia.9 All of the key 
coastal and distant water fishing States 
collaborated to establish the world’s most 
advanced regional fisheries management 
organisation with a mandate to ensure the 
long-term conservation and sustainable 
use of the WCPO tropical tuna fisheries. 
Seven years later, the members of the WCPFC 
now face a critical juncture. In order to fulfil 
their mandate and ensure the long-term 
conservation and sustainable use of the WCPO 
tropical tuna fisheries, they must cooperate to 
reduce overfishing in complex fisheries that 
catch multiple species, utilise multiple gears, 
and occur in multiple jurisdictions. 
This paper studies the mix of interests in the 
WCPO tropical tuna fisheries in order to better 
understand how these interests might influence 
the WCPFC’s ability to adopt measures for 
bigeye and yellowfin. As noted by Balton, the 
benefits from a fishery are a key influence on 
national negotiating positions.10 They influence 
each delegation’s national interest and drive 
negotiating positions to support or oppose 
certain measures depending upon how they 
impact on that State’s various interests. For 
the purposes of this analysis, the tropical 
tuna fisheries are defined as all fisheries in 
the WCPO that catch skipjack (Katsuwonus 
pelamis), bigeye (Thunnus obesus) or yellowfin 
(Thunnus albacares), regardless of whether the 
species is targeted or taken incidentally.
This analysis studies interests that are 
directly relevant to potential conservation and 
management measures. These include the 
interests and influences that each participating 
State has in particular species (bigeye, 
yellowfin, and skipjack) and particular gears 
(purse seine, longline), and more broadly, 
interests and influences related to access to 
fishing grounds; fishing vessels; food security; 
development aspirations; and markets. 
The study analyses all reported catches 
from within the WCPFC Statistical Area (the 
perceived range of the stocks) and is based 
on the most recent data that were available at 
the time of the study. Data are sourced from 
the 2011 WCPFC Yearbook Excel database,11 
the Value of WCPO Tuna Fisheries Excel 
database,12 and the WCPFC overview paper 
on the WCPO tuna fisheries.13 This covers 
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2008–10 catches that were reported in 2010 and 
published in 2011. Unless otherwise indicated, 
all subsequent figures were developed by the 
author using these databases. 
It is important to note that these data sets 
are likely to contain inaccuracies due to gaps 
in data, non-reporting, and misreporting of 
catches by vessels and States.14 In addition, 
the undefined western and northern 
boundaries of the WCPFC also create 
uncertainties in these data sets as not all 
coastal States within the WCPFC Statistical 
Area consistently provide tuna catch reports 
to the WCPFC or the Secretariat of the 
Pacific Community (SPC) for fisheries within 
their waters under national jurisdiction. 
The interests identified in the following analysis 
do not necessarily reflect the overall ‘national 
interest’ of a State. Many of the identified States 
will have multiple and diverse interests. While 
one consideration below might suggest that a 
State will oppose any conservation measure 
that negatively impacts its interests, another 
consideration might suggest otherwise. Such 
States will need to balance their interests when 
considering potential management responses. 
This paper does not pretend to determine the 
individual ‘national interest’ for each State. This 
is simply beyond the scope of a small report. 
Rather, the paper identifies some interests 
that may impact on, and complicate, the 
negotiation, adoption, and implementation of 
conservation and management measures for 
bigeye, yellowfin, and skipjack.
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PART ONE: THE WCPO TUNA FISHERIES
A critical management challenge for the 
WCPFC is the unsustainably high level of 
fishing activity in the WCPO tropical tuna 
fisheries that catch skipjack, bigeye, and 
yellowfin either intentionally as a target species 
or incidentally. Catches in the WCPO tuna 
fisheries have increased since the WCPFC’s 
founding Convention was adopted in 2000, 
with record catches for each of the tropical 
tuna species in recent years. The record catch 
for skipjack was 1,821,770 metric tonnes (mt) 
in 2009, while the 2008 catches of yellowfin 
and bigeye were the highest on record 
(541,262 and 157,173 mt, respectively).15
Three types of fisheries are primarily 
responsible for most commercial catches 
of WCPO tuna. Purse seine is by far the 
most significant, catching approximately 
1,820,844 mt in 2010. Longline fisheries 
caught 239,853 mt and pole and line caught 
171,604 mt. Various other gears caught 
143,829 mt (largely various fleets in Indonesia 
and the Philippines, with some small troll 
catches in New Zealand and Japan).16
Skipjack, bigeye, and yellowfin are distributed 
throughout the tropical and subtropical 
waters of the Pacific Ocean and migrate 
across numerous international boundaries. 
Consequently, they require international 
cooperation to ensure effective management 
across multiple jurisdictions. Skipjack and 
yellowfin also exhibit sufficient levels of 
residency to justify conservation measures that 
apply differentiated limits and regulations at 
subregional and national levels.17 
All three tropical tuna species are highly 
productive and fast-growing.18 Skipjack are 
by far the most productive, with a biomass 
estimated to be greater than that of bigeye and 
yellowfin combined.19 Skipjack grow rapidly and 
sexually mature at around one year, and can 
weigh 5 kilograms and reach 80 cm in length by 
age 4.20 Most captures occur on skipjack ages 1 
to 3.21 Most skipjack have had an opportunity to 
reproduce before capture, further strengthening 
the stock’s resilience to fishing.22 Yellowfin can 
weigh 30 kg and reach 120 cm by the time they 
reach maturity at approximately 2 years.23 Most 
captures occur on yellowfin 1 to 6 years old.24 
Bigeye are longer-lived and slower to mature, 
taking approximately three years.25 Most 
captures occur on bigeye 1 to 10 years old.26
STATUS OF SkIPjACk (KatSUWonUS PelamiS)
In 2011, the stock assessment for skipjack 
concluded that overfishing was not occurring, 
nor was the stock in an overfished state.27 
However, the WCPFC Scientific Committee 
advised that catch rates will decline as the 
skipjack stock is fished down to levels near the 
biomass capable of producing the maximum 
sustainable yield (BMSY). The Scientific 
Committee also noted recent rapid changes in 
fishing mortality and biomass indicators relative 
to MSY, and recommended that the WCPFC 
consider developing restrictions on fishing for 
skipjack to limit declines in catch rates.28 Such 
declines would likely impact on the economic 
efficiency of the fishery and its profitability.
 
The assessments noted that the purse-seine 
fishery dominates equatorial catches of 
skipjack, but scientists continued to struggle 
to understand the factors impacting on purse-
seine CPUE. The use of FADs and rapid changes 
in technology and catchability complicated 
efforts to define units of effort and better 
understand the fishery.29 In addition, there are 
questions about whether the current use of 
FADs undermines the potential yield of the stock 
due to the higher catches of small skipjack and 
concerns that the use of FADs may negatively 
affect the health and distribution of skipjack.30 
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STATUS OF yELLOWFIN (thUnnUS albaCareS)
In 2011, stock assessments indicated that 
the entire WCPO yellowfin stock was not 
experiencing overfishing. However, the 
assessments did note that significant regional 
differences existed in levels of fishing mortality, 
exploitation rates, and depletion and that the 
spawning biomass in the western equatorial 
region (where 81% of the total yellowfin catch is 
taken) had declined to approximately 31% of its 
unexploited level.31
The WCPFC Scientific Committee subsequently 
advised that yellowfin stocks are fully exploited 
and recommended against increases in fishing 
mortality. They indicated that Philippine and 
Indonesian surface fisheries have high levels 
of juvenile fishing mortality and that these 
fisheries, and purse-seine fishing on FADs, have 
 
the highest impact on yellowfin stocks, while 
purse-seine fishing on free-swimming schools 
has a moderate impact. These fisheries are 
having high impacts in the western equatorial 
region and, more generally, across the WCPO. 
The assessment also noted that Japanese 
coastal pole-and-line and purse-seine fisheries 
have a significant impact on biomass levels in 
their home region.32
Significantly, the Scientific Committee advised 
that high catches of juvenile yellowfin were 
reducing the potential yield of the yellowfin 
stock. Consequently, the Committee concluded 
that reductions in fishing mortality of juvenile 
yellowfin would increase MSY levels and the 
profitability of the fishery.33
STATUS OF BIgEyE (thUnnUS obSeSUS)
The bigeye fishery is targeted almost entirely 
by longline vessels. However, the use of FADs 
by the purse-seine fishery has resulted in 
significant catches of juvenile bigeye. Stock 
assessments for bigeye were conducted and 
reviewed by the WCPFC Scientific Committee 
almost every year since its establishment. 
These assessments have consistently raised 
concerns about the levels of fishing mortality 
on bigeye. Each assessment has indicated that 
overfishing on bigeye was occurring,34 and each 
Scientific Committee recommended that fishing 
mortality be reduced.35
The 2011 assessment indicated a change from 
previous ones and noted that purse-seine 
fisheries and other surface fisheries now have 
an equal or greater impact on the overall bigeye 
stock compared to longline fisheries. This 
shift from longline as the dominant impact to 
purse seine reflects the significant increases in 
purse-seine effort in recent years. Purse-seine 
fisheries and the Philippine and Indonesian 
domestic fisheries have a substantial impact in  
 
the western equatorial and, to a lesser extent, 
the eastern equatorial regions. The assessment 
also noted that Japanese coastal pole-and-line 
and purse-seine fisheries have a significant 
impact on biomass levels in their home region.36
Following the assessment, the 2011 Scientific 
Committee recommended a 39% reduction 
in fishing mortality on 2004 levels (or 28% on 
average of 2001-04). Alternatively, the Scientific 
Committee recommended a reduction of 32% 
from 2006–09 levels.37 As with yellowfin, the 
assessment found that high catches of juvenile 
bigeye were reducing the potential yield of 
the bigeye stock. Consequently, the Scientific 
Committee concluded that reductions in fishing 
mortality of juvenile bigeye would increase 
MSY levels and the profitability of the fishery.38
In summary, the scientific assessments 
suggest that bigeye stocks are experiencing 
overfishing and may be overfished, and 
that high levels of catches of juvenile 
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bigeye were undermining the productivity 
of the fishery, and its profitability. The 
assessments indicate that serious reductions 
are required across all gears, particularly 
in the surface and purse-seine fisheries.  
ECOSySTEM ISSUES AND ASSOCIATED AND DEPENDENT SPECIES
The WCPO tuna fisheries also impact more 
broadly on the WCPO oceanic ecosystem. 
There is considerable concern regarding these 
impacts, particularly in regard to associated and 
dependent species. Some nontarget species 
of fish and shark are captured incidentally and 
retained for subsequent use. Other nontarget 
species are captured incidentally but have 
little or no commercial value and are therefore 
discarded by the vessel. These discards can 
include seabirds, turtles, cetaceans, and sharks 
and various species of fish that may be of little 
interest to a fishing vessel focused on a specific 
market or processing factory.39
In the WCPO tuna fisheries, the purse-seine and 
longline gears have the largest incidental catch, 
while pole and line is far more selective and 
tends to take only small amounts of mahimahi, 
rainbow runners, and nontarget tunas (although 
pole and line can cause significant impacts 
if baitfish supply fisheries are not effectively 
managed).40 Key concerns for the purse-seine 
and longline fleets relate to the potential 
impacts of incidental catch on vulnerable 
species (i.e., seabirds, cetaceans, turtles, and 
sharks).41 
The use of FADs by purse-seine fleets has also 
raised serious conservation concerns. Purse-
seine sets on schools associated with FADs 
and logs will catch smaller fish, particularly 
juvenile yellowfin and bigeye, whereas sets 
on unassociated free-swimming schools (i.e., 
non-FAD sets) will catch larger skipjack and/
or adult yellowfin.42 Proponents argue that 
PHOTO: MAKOTO HIROSE / SEAPICS.COM
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FADs have increased the efficiency of purse 
seining,43 while others note that the significant 
reduction in the size of fish caught undermines 
the efficiency gains.44
In addition to their significant impacts on 
bigeye and high levels of juvenile catch, 
scientists have raised concerns that the use 
of FADs may be creating an ‘ecological trap’.45 
An ecological trap is an event wherein growth 
is reduced due to individuals making poor 
habitat choices. Studies have suggested that 
tuna associated with FADs are less healthy than 
those in unassociated free-swimming schools.46 
It has also been pointed out that the use of 
FADs is introducing further uncertainties into 
scientific assessments due to their impact on 
tuna behaviour.47
REDUCED PROFITABILITy
Since the mid-1990s, various studies have 
suggested that the profitability of the WCPO 
tuna fisheries could be increased through 
significant changes in fleet composition and 
reductions in most, if not all, fleets.48 Among 
other things, these studies have suggested 
that fishing capacity is significantly above 
optimal levels, thereby reducing the profitability 
of the WCPO tuna fisheries. In addition, the 
current fleet composition (i.e., mix of gears) 
does not necessarily maximise the benefit 
from WCPO tuna fisheries. Catches of bigeye 
and yellowfin by purse-seine fishing vessels, 
particularly juveniles in schools associated 
with FADs, provide a smaller benefit to the 
overall value of the WCPO tuna fisheries than 
would be achieved if these fish had been 
allowed to mature and then be caught by 
longline. The overall benefit from the WCPO 
tuna fisheries would be significantly higher 
if these tuna were caught in a manner (such 
as by longline) that allowed their maximum 
value to be reached. If purse seiners had been 
prohibited from setting on schools associated 
with FADs and were able to otherwise avoid 
all catches of bigeye, then these fish may 
potentially have become available to the 
longline fishery for a far greater benefit to the 
overall value of the WCPO tuna fisheries. 
Reducing overcapacity or changing fleet 
and species compositions would likely 
maximise the benefit from the WCPO tuna 
fisheries and deliver significant conservation 
outcomes. Bioeconomic modelling has 
indicated that reductions of 50 to 68% in 
fishing effort levels (particularly in purse-
seine fleets) would significantly increase 
the profitability of the combined WCPO 
tuna fisheries and maximise the total 
resource rents across the whole region.49 
However, such reductions would also transfer 
benefits from States with significant purse-
seine interests to those with significant 
longline interests. Bioeconomic modelling has 
found that the benefits from significant fleet 
restructuring and purse-seine reductions would 
be enjoyed disproportionately and that the 
actual outcomes could be detrimental to coastal 
States with significant purse-seine fisheries.50 
Consequently, any resolution of overcapacity 
and fleet structures will likely require some 
mechanism to equitably distribute the 
reductions and benefits.
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PART TWO: INTERESTS AND INFLUENCE
It is critically important that the skipjack, 
yellowfin, and bigeye fisheries are managed 
effectively throughout their range—within 
and between EEZs and on the high seas. 
Unrestrained exploitation in a particular 
EEZ or on the high seas has the potential to 
significantly affect catches elsewhere with 
potentially devastating consequences for 
developing coastal States, some of which have 
few alternative resources.
The intermeshed characteristics of the WCPO 
tropical tuna fisheries make it difficult for the 
WCPFC to sufficiently reduce fishing mortality 
of bigeye, and restrain fishing mortality for 
yellowfin, without significantly impacting on 
fishing activities for skipjack. For example, 
purse seiners primarily target skipjack, and to a 
lesser degree yellowfin, but also catch bigeye 
incidentally. While the incidental catch of bigeye 
by purse-seine fleets accounts for a very small 
percentage (1 to 3%) of the total purse-seine 
catch, it nevertheless has a significant impact on 
bigeye stocks due to the sheer size of this catch. 
For the WCPFC to resolve the threat to bigeye, 
it must restrict the operation of purse-seine 
vessels that are targeting highly productive 
skipjack that are not currently threatened by 
overfishing. However, purse-seine fleets will 
receive little or no long-term sustainability 
benefit or increase in profitability if bigeye 
stocks rebuild. Longline fleets will directly 
benefit from conservation measures that 
rebuild bigeye stocks as this will increase 
the profitability of longline fleets through 
improvements to their CPUE.
This creates an inherently difficult and 
challenging problem to solve as ultimately 
the members of the WCPFC have little choice 
but to develop, negotiate, and implement 
conservation and management measures that 
affect a broad range of fleets and stakeholders 
and impact upon a diverse range of interests. 
Such conservation and management measures 
implicitly allocate a ‘conservation burden’ 
on participants in the WCPO fisheries. Each 
participating State must apply costs to its fleets 
through limiting fishing opportunities and 
regulating their activities. In order to implement 
these measures, governments must fund 
national institutions to implement national 
regulations and govern their implementation, 
while potentially increasing the management 
costs on their fleets through more complex and 
costly licensing arrangements. Depending upon 
its structure, the conservation and management 
measure will impact directly and indirectly 
on various participants: reducing benefits 
for some; limiting opportunities for others; 
and protecting or potentially even increasing 
benefits for some participants. 
To further complicate matters, conservation 
and management measures may impact on 
developing States that depend significantly on 
these fisheries and have strong aspirations to 
further develop their benefits. Some of these 
States will have few other development and 
resource options and will be more heavily 
impacted by the conservation burden than other 
States with diverse resources, large institutions 
and substantial revenue streams from 
multiple economic activities. Consequently, 
the question of how the conservation 
burden is distributed is fundamental to 
conservation and management negotiations.
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COASTAL AND FLAg STATE INTERESTS
This section studies the mix of interests in the 
WCPO tropical tuna fisheries in order to better 
understand how these interests might influence 
the WCPFC’s ability to adopt measures for 
bigeye and yellowfin. This analysis studies 
interests that are directly relevant to potential 
conservation and management measures. 
These include the interests and influences that 
each participating State has in particular species 
(bigeye, yellowfin, and skipjack) and particular 
gears (purse seine and longline) and, more 
broadly, interests and influences related to 
access to fishing grounds; fishing vessels; food 
security; markets; and development aspirations.
FIGURE 5.
Key tropical tuna coastal States by proportion of average 2008–2010 value of catch taken from EEZs
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Fourteen States collectively control almost 
all fishing activities that impact on skipjack, 
bigeye and yellowfin: Papua New Guinea, 
Indonesia, the Philippines, Japan, Kiribati, 
Solomon Islands, Nauru, Federated States of 
Micronesia, Tuvalu, the Marshall Islands, South 
Korea, Chinese Taipei, the United States, and 
China. Figure 5 identifies the key coastal States 
that control access to the most valuable fishing 
grounds in the WCPO tropical tuna fisheries 
and identifies their key interests by gear and 
species. Figure 6 identifies the key flag States 
that control the most productive fishing fleets 
and identifies their primary interests by gear 
and species. Together, these 14 ‘core’ States 
effectively control the WCPO tuna fisheries and 
are ultimately responsible for implementing 
conservation and management measures that 
directly limit or regulate fishing activities.
FIGURE 6.
Key tropical tuna flag States by proportion of average 2008–2010 value of catch
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 Skipjack.  Papua New Guinea, Kiribati, 
Indonesia, and the Philippines control the 
most valuable fishing grounds for skipjack, 
followed by the Federated States of 
Micronesia, Solomon Islands, Japan, Nauru, 
Tuvalu, and the Marshall Islands. Japan is 
the dominant flag State for skipjack fisheries, 
followed by the Philippines, South Korea, 
Indonesia, the United States, Chinese Taipei, 
Papua New Guinea, China, the Marshall 
Islands, and Vanuatu. 
 Purse-seine fleets dominate the skipjack 
fisheries, although pole and line is still a 
significant gear for skipjack fisheries in Japan 
and Indonesia. Figure 7 identifies the top 10 
coastal States that control access to the most 
valuable fishing grounds for skipjack and 
the top 10 flag States that control the most 
productive fishing fleets. 
 Yellowfin.  Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, 
and the Philippines control the most valuable 
fishing grounds for yellowfin, followed by 
FIGURE 7.
Average value of skipjack catches by gear for coastal States in US$millions
Average value of skipjack catches by gear for flag States in US$millions
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Kiribati, Japan, the Solomon Islands, Chinese 
Taipei, the Federated States of Micronesia, 
Nauru and Fiji. Indonesia, Japan, Chinese 
Taipei, and the Philippines are the dominant 
flag States for yellowfin, followed by the 
Solomon Islands, South Korea, Papua New 
Guinea, the United States, China, and Fiji. 
 Yellowfin is targeted by various gears, but 
particularly longline and purse seine. This 
can have significant ramifications for the 
value of the catch due to the substantially 
lower prices for purse seine (for canning) 
compared with longline (for fresh and frozen 
products). For example, while Chinese 
fishing fleets catch significantly less tonnage 
than U.S. fleets, China has a far higher 
proportion of longline catch, and the value 
of its entire yellowfin catch is therefore only 
slightly less than that enjoyed by the United 
States (which is predominantly a purse-
seine catch). Figure 8 identifies the top 10 
coastal and flag States for yellowfin and 
demonstrates that all of the States with a 
significant interest in yellowfin report some 
catch (generally the majority) by purse seine. 
The Philippines, Indonesia, and Japan also 
have significant catches by other artisanal 
gears and pole-and-line vessels.
FIGURE 8.
Average value of yellowfin catches by gear for coastal States in US$millions
Average value of yellowfin catches by gear for flag States in US$millions
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 Bigeye.  Bigeye is targeted by longliners 
and some other small-scale gears but is 
also a significant bycatch within the purse-
seine fishery. However, as discussed earlier, 
this bycatch provides far less benefit than 
that enjoyed by users of longline and other 
gears. Therefore, the analysis distinguishes 
between the interests of those States that 
benefit from targeted fishing for bigeye and 
have a positive interest in the species and 
those States that benefit from purse-seine 
activities but gain little from bycatch of 
bigeye.
 
 Figure 9 demonstrates that Japan controls 
the most valuable fishing grounds for bigeye 
within waters under national jurisdiction 
and that it accounted for 13% of the value of 
bigeye fisheries (not including purse-seine 
bycatch). This was followed by Kiribati, 
Indonesia, the Marshall Islands, the United 
States, the Federated States of Micronesia, 
Palau, Australia, the Philippines, and French 
Polynesia. Japan, Chinese Taipei, South 
Korea, and China are the dominant flag 
States for bigeye fisheries, followed by 
the United States, Indonesia, Vanuatu, the 
Federated States of Micronesia, Australia, 
and Fiji. 
FIGURE 9.
Top ten coastal States that impact and benefit from bigeye fisheries (proportion of average 2008–2010 
total non-purse seine bigeye value)
Top ten flag States that impact and benefit from bigeye fisheries (proportion of average 2008–2010 
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 Figure 10 identifies States that have a 
significant ‘negative’ interest in bigeye 
through their control over purse-seine 
fisheries that impact significantly on bigeye 
but receive little direct benefit. The term 
‘negative’ is used in this context as this 
interest provides a liability with no benefit. 
These interests must be addressed but may 
require special consideration to motivate 
these interests and avoid inequitable 
outcomes.
 Papua New Guinea and Kiribati, followed 
by Indonesia, the Philippines, the Federated 
States of Micronesia, Nauru, the Solomon 
Islands, Tuvalu, the Marshall Islands, Japan, 
and Tokelau all control fishing grounds 
with highly active purse-seine fisheries that 
impact significantly on bigeye for minimal 
benefit. Indonesia, Spain, the United States, 
the Philippines, Japan, Papua New Guinea, 
Chinese Taipei, Ecuador, South Korea, and 
the Marshall Islands all control purse-seine 
fleets that impact significantly on bigeye for 
minimal benefit. 
FIGURE 10.
Top ten purse-seine coastal States that impact on bigeye for minimal benefits (proportion of average 
2008–2010 total purse-seine bigeye value)
Top ten purse-seine flag States that impact on bigeye for minimal benefits (proportion of average 
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 Those States with the biggest ’negative’ 
interest identified in Figure 10 have the most 
significant problem with bycatch of bigeye 
by purse-seine fleets. The European Union 
(Spain), Papua New Guinea, Ecuador, Nauru, 
Tuvalu, and the Solomon Islands all have a 
‘negative’ interest in bigeye, and gain little 
or no positive benefit. Consequently, these 
States receive little benefit from conservation 
measures that improve the status of bigeye 
stocks. In the context of WCPFC negotiations, 
these States have an immediate interest in 
minimising application to purse-seine fleets 
and maximising the conservation burden on 
other gears that catch bigeye.
 The United States, Japan, the Philippines, 
Indonesia, Chinese Taipei, South Korea, 
China, the Marshall Islands, Kiribati, Vanuatu, 
and the Federated States of Micronesia 
simultaneously have a positive and negative 
interest in bigeye to varying degrees. Given 
these potentially conflicting interests, these 
States may experience internal tensions 
as they negotiate and determine their 
national interest. Regardless of their ultimate 
interpretation of their national interest, 
these States will have some form of interest 
in bigeye conservation and management 
but must balance conflicting interests 
between purse-seine and longline fleets.
 Fiji, Australia, Palau, and French Polynesia 
have solely positive interests in bigeye. 
These States have an interest in supporting 
conservation measures that ensure the 
sustainability of bigeye stocks while 
maximising the conservation burden on 
purse-seine fleets. 
 Interestingly, the States that have the most 
significant purse-seine impacts on bigeye are 
not necessarily those States with the largest 
interests in purse-seine fishing. Figure 11 
FIGURE 11.
Top ten purse-seine coastal States
(2008–2010 values)
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identifies the top 10 coastal and flag purse-
seine States. 
 Comparison with Figure 10 identifies 
some States with purse-seine interests 
that are not relatively significant purse-
seine States but do impact significantly 
on bigeye nevertheless. The two most 
obvious are the European Union (Spain) 
and Ecuador, which individually account 
for 11 and 7%, respectively, of all bigeye 
purse-seine bycatch, but do not rate within 
the top 10 purse-seine States. On the other 
hand, South Korean purse-seine fleets 
account for only 6% of bigeye bycatch, 
despite their significantly larger share 
(14%) of the total purse-seine fishery.
 In part, this is due to variances between 
fleets in the usage of FADs. For example, 
vessels registered in Spain and Ecuador 
have been highly dependent on FADs over 
much of the past decade, as have vessels 
flagged to the United States, El Salvador, 
the Marshall Islands, New Zealand, and 
the Solomon Islands.51 Korean fleets, on 
the other hand, report a far lower use of 
FADs. Similar distinctions arise for coastal 
States, although there is less differentiation 
between each State’s interests. FAD and log 
sets account for 40 to 70% of all purse-seine 
sets within the EEZs of Pacific island tropical 
coastal States. These characteristics have 
begun to alter since the full implementation 
of the three-month FAD closures by the 
Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA) for 
waters under their jurisdiction and the 
WCPFC more broadly. This has resulted in 
significant declines in FAD use by all fleets. 
COASTAL AND FLAg STATE INFLUENCE
Figures 1 through 4 illustrate the gear and 
species interests for all States that reported 
catches between 2008 and 2010. Seven of the 
core 14 States that control the fishing grounds 
and fishing fleets can be roughly identified as 
‘purse-seine/skipjack States.’ Most of these 
States are part of the group of coastal States 
that dominate the most productive fishing 
grounds (Papua New Guinea, Kiribati, Tuvalu, 
Nauru, the Federated States of Micronesia, 
and the Solomon Islands). Most of the benefits 
that these six States enjoy from the WCPO 
tuna fisheries come from skipjack (compared 
to bigeye and yellowfin), purse-seine fisheries 
(compared to longline and other gears), and 
licensing revenue for access to their EEZ 
(compared to their vessel registry interests). 
These interests provide an incentive for these 
six States to support measures that distribute 
much of the conservation burden onto longline 
fleets. The dominant coastal State interests of 
these six States also encourage these States to 
support conservation measures that distinguish 
between high seas and EEZs. 
The seventh of the purse-seine/skipjack States 
is the United States. The United States is 
dominated by its vessel registry interests, 
which provide significantly greater catches from 
the WCPO tuna fisheries, than the catch from 
within its EEZ. Although far less significant in 
the context of its overall interest, the United 
States also catches substantial amounts 
of bigeye through its Hawaiian longline 
fisheries. These interests provide incentives 
for the United States to support measures 
that minimise the conservation burden on 
its purse-seine DWFN fleets and its coastal 
longline fisheries. As an established DWFN, 
the United States also has a strong interest 
in protecting its historical level of activity and 
would be motivated to argue for measures 
that distribute the burden of conservation 
across all waters of the WCPO, without regard 
to waters under national jurisdiction.
The United States, the Solomon Islands, 
the Marshall Islands, the European Union, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, and New Zealand also 
have significant interests in purse-seine 
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fisheries that set on FADs. South Korean 
fleets on the other hand report a far lower 
use of FADs. Consequently, a conservation 
measure that proposes a FAD prohibition to 
address overfishing of juvenile bigeye will 
have far less impact on Korean interests than 
a generalised limit on purse-seine effort. 
Alternatively, heavily FAD-reliant purse-seine 
fleets may consider a generalised limit on 
purse-seine effort to affect their interests less 
significantly than a prohibition on the use 
of FADs. As noted above, similar questions 
arise for coastal States, although there is 
less differentiation and the coastal States 
have been actively pursuing a reduction in 
FAD usage through the PNA FAD closures. 
The remaining seven core States have fishing 
interests that are more widely distributed 
across multiple gears, mostly longline and 
purse seine but also some pole-and-line and 
other artisanal gears. They are Japan, the 
Philippines, Indonesia, Chinese Taipei, South 
Korea, China, and the Marshall Islands. Each 
of these States is a significant flag State, while 
four of these also have significant coastal 
State catches. The Marshall Islands has a 
significant fleet that returns more benefit than 
the fisheries within its EEZ, and has a strong 
interest in skipjack but also has a moderate 
interest in yellowfin, and minimal interest in 
bigeye. China is evenly split as a flag State 
with moderate interests in bigeye, skipjack and 
yellowfin. Korea and Indonesia have strong 
skipjack interests balanced with moderate 
bigeye and yellowfin interests. The Philippines 
has a strong skipjack interest balanced with 
a moderate yellowfin interest. Chinese Taipei 
is dominated by yellowfin interests within its 
coastal waters, while its flag State interests 
are more evenly balanced between skipjack, 
yellowfin, and bigeye. Japanese interests 
are fairly evenly spread between the three 
species, favouring skipjack as a flag State and 
bigeye as a coastal State. These States must 
balance the costs and benefits of different 
conservation measures across their own 
domestic interests when considering how 
best to address conservation challenges. 
The positions of the coastal States with mixed 
interests in multiple gears and species are 
further complicated by their significant flag 
State interests. This is particularly a challenge 
for Indonesia and the Philippines, which have 
extensive vessel interests that extend into 
the high seas. This significantly undermines 
any motivation that these States may have in 
supporting high seas closures or conservation 
measures that prioritise conservation 
reductions on the high seas over waters under 
national jurisdictions.
DEvELOPMENT INTERESTS 
Conservation and management measures may 
also impact heavily on developing States that 
depend significantly on these fisheries and 
have strong aspirations to further develop their 
benefits. Almost all of the key coastal States in 
the WCPO tropical tuna fisheries are developing 
States. These States are ultimately responsible 
for managing the majority of the WCPO tropical 
tuna fisheries and implementing conservation 
and management measures. In addition to their 
rights and responsibilities over the fisheries 
within their EEZs, they have significant interests 
in various fishing activities and aspire to further 
develop their interests and benefits. Some of 
these States will have few other development 
and resource options and will be more heavily 
impacted by the conservation burden than other 
States with diverse resources, large institutions, 
and substantial revenue streams from multiple 
economic activities. 
The special requirements of these developing 
States were a core issue in the negotiation of 
the WCPF Convention and were incorporated 
into its Article 30. The Pacific Islands Forum 
Fisheries Agency referred to this Article as the 
‘foundation on which the Commission will be 
built’.52 Article 30.2 establishes the principle 
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that the WCPFC must take into account the 
special requirements of developing States (and 
territories and colonies), particularly small 
island States. In this context, the WCPFC must 
consider: the vulnerability of these States 
and territories that depend on the fisheries, 
including food-security concerns; the need 
to avoid adverse impacts on, and ensure 
access to fisheries by, subsistence, small-
scale and artisanal fishers and fishworkers, 
as well as indigenous people in these States 
and territories; and the need to ensure that 
measures do not result in transferring, directly 
or indirectly, a disproportionate burden of 
conservation action onto these States and 
territories. These special requirements, and 
the importance of marine resources to the 
sustainable development of these States, 
have also been recognised in other globally 
significant agreements, such as the Barbados 
Programme of Action for the Sustainable 
Development of Small Island Developing 
States and the World Summit for Sustainable 
Development’s (WSSD) Johannesburg Plan of 
Implementation.
In this context, the small island developing 
State members of the WCPFC have actively 
supported the insertion of an exemption in 
every WCPFC conservation and management 
measure to protect the development aspirations 
of small island developing States and territories 
in accordance with Article 30 of the WCPF 
Convention. Paragraph 6 of CMM 2008-01 
exempts the domestic fisheries of these States 
from the conservation limits that are prescribed 
in the conservation measure.
FOOD SECURITy AND ARTISANAL FISHINg INTERESTS
Many of the WCPO coastal States are home to 
coastal communities that depend heavily upon 
living marine resources for food security and 
employment in artisanal fisheries. Among the 
Pacific islands, the tuna fisheries represent an 
important source of protein. Scientists have 
recommended that Pacific island governments 
should increase local access to these tuna 
fisheries in order to partly meet increasing 
Pacific island food security requirements.53 
Recent studies have estimated that 75% of 
Pacific island coastal fisheries will not meet 
projected food security needs due to a forecast 
50% growth in population by 2030, limited 
productivity of coastal fisheries (exacerbated 
by overfishing), and inadequate national 
distribution networks.54 
Similarly, coastal communities within Vietnam, 
Indonesia and the Philippines also depend 
heavily on living marine resources for food 
security.55 Unfortunately, coastal fisheries 
resources throughout Southeast Asia are 
in severe decline due to overfishing. This is 
increasing poverty throughout artisanal fishing 
communities and reducing the contribution of 
fisheries to food security, among other things.56 
The following coastal States are home to 
coastal communities that depend upon WCPO 
tuna fisheries for food security and artisanal 
employment to some degree:57 Indonesia, 
Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Japan, 
the Solomon Islands, New Caledonia, U.S. 
territories, Tokelau, Tuvalu, Palau, Nauru, 
Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Samoa, Fiji, 
American Samoa, Vanuatu, the Cook Islands, 
French Polynesia, Niue, and Tonga. Many of the 
subsistence and artisanal fisheries that operate 
in these States and territories catch significant 
proportions of tuna.58 It bears noting that 11 
of the 14 core States have interests in food 
security for their coastal communities.
The value of artisanal catches in some 
Pacific island States may exceed the value of 
commercial catches.59 For example, Kiribati 
received approximately AU$32 million in 
government revenue from distant water fishing 
access fees in 2008. However, the artisanal 
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fishing industry caught approximately 12,800 
mt in 2008, valued at around AU$33.2 million. 
While much of this value was consumed locally 
and provided little revenue, the locally based 
artisanal fleets operated approximately 4,800 
vessels (less than 7 meters) and directly or 
indirectly employed 20,000 people—roughly 
20% of the entire Kiribati population.60
Many of the States with food-security interests 
must balance tensions between artisanal and 
commercial fishing interests. Many Pacific 
island States have implemented regulations 
to protect near-shore artisanal fisheries and 
prohibit distant water fleets from fishing within 
coastal exclusion zones. Nevertheless, artisanal 
communities throughout the WCPO region 
continue to express concerns at the perceived 
impacts of distant water fishing fleets on 
artisanal fisheries.61 These tensions are likely 
to increase if coastal fisheries continue their 
decline and increasingly transfer effort to near-
shore skipjack tuna and anchored FADs.
Given their food security interests, these 
coastal States will suffer from conservation 
measures that limit artisanal catches or 
inequitably transfer any conservation burden 
onto artisanal communities. Furthermore, these 
States will have an explicit interest in ensuring 
that key fish stocks are sustained at a level to 
support continued food security for coastal 
communities.
MARkET INTERESTS
A number of States around the world, including 
many of the core 14, have a market interest 
in the WCPO tropical tuna fisheries through 
their consumption of tuna products. Figure 12 
demonstrates the global nature of the market 
for WCPO tuna and illustrates the largest 
market States (dark red).
FIGURE 12.  Map of market States with interest in WCPO tuna fisheries (includes processing
States that import loins for processing and subsequent export).
0 = Significant market for tuna, but little from WCPO 
1 = Consumes thousands of mt of canned/loined tuna and/or minor market for sashimi some/all from WCPO
2 = Consumes 20,000 to 40,000 mt of canned/loined tuna and/or medium market for sashimi some/all from WCPO
3 = Consumes over 40,000 mt of canned/loined tuna and/or large market for sashimi some/all from WCPO
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Tropical tuna are processed into a variety of 
products, ranging from minimally processed 
fresh and frozen whole tuna (i.e., bigeye and 
yellowfin), through various loining stages 
to fully processed canned retail products 
(i.e., skipjack and yellowfin). Canned tuna 
is one of the most significant products that 
originate from the WCPO purse-seine fisheries. 
Processing of canned tuna occurs in two stages. 
Loining is where the fish is headed, gutted, de-
boned, pre-cooked and prepared for canning.
The loins are then canned and cooked a second 
time in an automated process.
The commodity chains that provide the raw 
tuna, through the processing stages, and 
into the final retail product are complex and 
globalised.62 Much of the product (particularly 
canned tuna) is traded through a small number 
of companies.63 Given the complexity of the 
global tuna commodity chain, and the highly 
globalised market, it is difficult to consistently 
determine exactly what proportion of each tuna 
product in each market originated from the 
WCPO tuna fisheries. Global market reports and 
industry studies do not break down import and 
export of retail or processed product by coastal 
State origin and only provide export data for 
processing States or ‘producer’ States.64 This 
can be misleading if interpreted incorrectly, as 
producer States may not include catches taken 
through access agreements inside EEZs by 
foreign vessels. For example, three of the core 
14 States (Kiribati, Tuvalu, and Nauru) report 
little or no tuna export despite the significance 
of their coastal catches, because these catches 
are not landed.65 
This analysis works around this limitation by 
cross-referencing various industry reports 
and secondary literature, so as to determine 
where most WCPO catch goes for processing, 
and consequently which States have a 
significant interest in processing that is, in 
part, dependent upon tropical tuna sourced 
from the WCPO fisheries. However, it is not 
possible to consistently determine the exact 
proportion of the exported processed product 
that originated from the WCPO tuna fisheries. 
Within this limited context, the analysis 
identifies the world’s key processing States 
that land or import tuna from the WCPO, and 
then assesses their interest in processing 
by the significance of their total processed 
tuna exports. Given that these States import 
or land tuna from the WCPO, and the global 
significance of the WCPO tropical tuna 
fishery, the analysis makes an assumption 
that the State therefore has an interest in 
continuing supply from the WCPO tropical 
tuna fisheries for its processing operations.
The analysis also assesses import and export 
data for canned tuna and identifies those 
markets with the most significant interests. The 
assessment is based on imports of canned tuna 
for retail consumption. The connections to the 
WCPO tropical tuna fisheries are confirmed 
through the commodity chain, industry reports 
or secondary literature. For example, Thailand 
is identified as the world’s largest processor of 
canned tuna. Thailand is also the recipient of 
almost half of the WCPO’s purse-seine catch.66 
Therefore, there is a reasonable assumption 
that markets which are supplied by Thailand 
canneries consume some amount of tuna from 
the WCPO.
CANNINg AND LOININg MARkET INTERESTS
The WCPO tropical tuna fisheries are a critical 
source of raw product for tuna processing. 
A large number of intermediary ports and 
processing States, from Europe through Asia 
to the Americas, are increasingly impacted 
by landings and processing of tuna caught in 
the WCPO.67 Thailand is the most significant 
canning and loining processor of tuna caught 
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in the WCPO. Other States with canning and 
loining industries that land or import tuna 
(raw or loins) from the WCPO include: Japan, 
Philippines, Korea, China, Vietnam, Indonesia, 
American Samoa, Papua New Guinea, Ecuador, 
El Salvador, Mexico, Fiji, Solomon Islands, 
Marshall Islands, Tonga, Italy, and Spain.68 
Some WCPO States and territories also export 
various fresh, smoked and frozen products to 
global markets. Much of this requires minimal 
processing infrastructure compared to canning 
and loining, although some operations such 
as katsuoboshi69 require significant processing 
infrastructure. States with such processing 
and export interests include:70 Chinese Taipei, 
Korea, Japan, Vanuatu, Indonesia, Papua 
New Guinea, Thailand, Philippines, China, 
Fiji, Marshall Islands, USA, New Zealand, 
Niue, Palau, Vietnam, Australia, Solomon 
Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, 
Samoa, Cook Islands, and Tonga.
While it is not possible to assess the level of 
interest that these States have in processing 
WCPO tuna, it is fairly clear that Thailand, USA, 
Japan, China, Philippines, Korea, American 
Samoa, and increasingly Papua New Guinea 
and Indonesia all have significant interests in 
domestic processing operations that are highly 
dependent upon consistent supplies of skipjack 
and yellowfin. Consequently each of these 
States has a strong interest in the continued 
operation of the skipjack and yellowfin fisheries 
and their provision of cheap raw material for 
their factories. The interests within these States 
may suffer if conservation measures were to 
restrict supply seasonally (as could happen if 
the WCPFC were to adopt proposals to close the 
entire WCPO purse-seine fishery for 3 months 
a year),71 or increase the costs of raw materials, 
as may have occurred following the adoption 
of CMM2008-01.72 Similarly, these States 
would suffer if the WCPFC failed to address 
sustainability concerns for yellowfin. For those 
States with other coastal State interests, this 
may present internal tensions as these States 
balance their interests in a cheap supply 
for processing factories with an interest to 
increase access and licensing revenue through 
tightening supply and access.  
CONSUMER MARkETS
The largest tuna markets in the world for fresh, 
frozen, smoked, and canned tuna are the USA, 
Japan, and Europe.73 All of these markets, to 
some degree, depend upon the WCPO tropical 
tuna fisheries for their supply. In addition, 
markets in developing States are looking 
towards domestically produced and imported 
canned tuna to counter food insecurity and as 
a cheap form of protein.74 Within this context, 
conservation and management decisions 
within the WCPFC, particularly in regard to 
skipjack and purse-seine fisheries, can quickly 
affect global markets and have significant 
repercussions on prices.75
Within the European Union, the key markets 
for canned tuna that have some proportion 
originating from the WCPO tuna fisheries are 
the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, European 
Union (Spain), Belgium, France,76 and the 
Netherlands.77 Other identifiable markets for 
WCPO sourced canned tuna include:78 Australia, 
Egypt, Libya, Canada, Saudi Arabia, South 
Africa, Korea, Mexico, Poland, Tunisia, Turkey, 
Iran, Syria, Israel, Argentina, and the United 
Arab Emirates.
These States each have a strong interest in 
the continued provision of cheap skipjack and 
yellowfin, and the long term sustainability of 
these fisheries. The market interests within 
these States may suffer if the WCPFC were 
to fail to address sustainability concerns for 
yellowfin, or were to adopt conservation 
measures that increased the costs of skipjack 
and yellowfin enough to impact on retail prices. 
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The largest markets for non-canned tropical 
tuna, primarily bigeye and yellowfin, but also 
some skipjack in smoked forms, are Japan, the 
United States, Europe, and other Northeast 
Asia States (South Korea, China, Chinese 
Taipei). In Europe, tuna is consumed mainly 
as steaks, while Americans consume tuna as 
steaks and sashimi. Japan primarily consumes 
tuna as sashimi.79 As above, it is not currently 
possible to consistently determine exactly what 
proportion of this trade originates from the 
WCPO tuna fisheries. However, given general 
references to exports of WCPO fresh, smoked, 
and frozen products to these markets, it is 
reasonable to state that these are important 
markets for fresh, smoked, and frozen tuna from 
the WCPO.80 Furthermore, there are a number 
of smaller domestic markets throughout the 
region for local landings of fresh and frozen 
tuna, and small but significant export markets 
to Australia, Canada, and New Zealand.81
All the market States identified above have 
some level of interest in the continued 
sustainability of bigeye and yellowfin, but  
none more so than Japan. Japan’s over-
whelming share of the sashimi market, and that 
market’s dependence on bigeye and high-grade 
yellowfin (in addition to other fisheries for 
bluefin), gives it a strong market-driven interest 
in the sustainability of bigeye and yellowfin. 
Japanese market interests would suffer if 
longline CPUE for bigeye and yellowfin were to 
decline, forcing prices to rise. 
Much like the fishing interests discussed 
earlier, the market interests of the States 
identified above may conflict domestically in 
States that consume significant amounts of 
canned tuna, and significant amounts of fresh 
and frozen tuna, particularly in the case of 
Japan and the United States with their large 
markets for high-grade sashimi. The United 
States and Japan, and to a lesser extent South 
Korea, China, Chinese Taipei, and Europe, must 
balance the costs and benefits of different 
conservation measures across their own 
domestic market interests in canned tuna and 
sashimi when considering how best to address 
conservation challenges.
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PART THREE: CONSERvATION AND MANAgEMENT CHALLENgES
The WCPFC faces an increasingly complex 
and urgent conservation and management 
challenge. The scientific assessments clearly 
indicate that urgent action is required to 
address overfishing and reduce fishing 
mortality for bigeye, halt any increases in 
fishing mortality for yellowfin, reduce fishing 
mortality of juvenile bigeye and yellowfin, and 
develop precautionary limits for skipjack. 
The conservation challenge is complicated by 
the multigear, multispecies, and multinational 
characteristics of the WCPO tropical tuna 
fisheries. Each species of tropical tuna is caught 
by each gear in a tightly intermeshed manner 
that is difficult, if not impossible, to separate. 
Consequently, this makes the fishery inherently 
challenging to manage. This complexity is 
exacerbated by the substantially different 
biological characteristics of skipjack, yellowfin, 
and bigeye (i.e., highly resilient and productive 
skipjack compared to the longer-lived and less 
productive bigeye). 
The complex and intermeshed nature of the 
WCPO tropical tuna fisheries makes it extremely 
challenging to address a specific management 
issue, such as overfishing of bigeye, with a 
narrowly focused management response. 
Consequently, the WCPFC and its members 
must develop, negotiate, and implement a 
conservation and management measure that 
includes a package of management options that 
will collectively achieve the conservation goal. 
The conservation and management measure 
must meet the following requirements.
1. It must be consistent with the WCPF Convention and other relevant instruments. The 
conservation and management measure must:82
 a. be based on the best scientific evidence available;
 b. ensure the long-term conservation and sustainable use of the WCPO tuna fisheries and   
 their optimum utilisation;
 c. maintain or restore stocks at levels capable of producing maximum sustainable yield, as   
 qualified by relevant environmental and economic factors;
 d. adopt a precautionary approach;
 e. avoid adverse impacts on the marine environment and maintain the integrity of marine   
 ecosystems;
 f. ensure that conservation and management measures do not result in transferring a   
 disproportionate burden of conservation onto developing State parties and territories.
2. In order for the conservation and management measure to be consistent with the best 
available scientific evidence (advice of the WCPFC Scientific Committee), the measure 
must:83
 a. reduce fishing mortality for bigeye by a minimum of 39% from 2004 levels, or 28% from   
 average 2001–04 levels, or 32% from average 2006–09 levels;
 b. reduce fishing mortality of juvenile bigeye in order to increase potential yield and optimise 
 utilisation;
 c. ensure no increase in fishing mortality for yellowfin in the western equatorial region;
 d. reduce fishing mortality of juvenile yellowfin in order to increase potential yield and   
 optimise utilisation;
 e. implement precautionary limits on fishing activities for skipjack.
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3. In order for the conservation and management measure to be consistent with the scientific 
advice and address the key impacts on the tropical tuna stocks, the measure must balance a 
mix of management options that:
 a. limit longline catches of bigeye;
 b. restrict purse-seine fishing activities;
 c. limit pole-and-line catches of yellowfin in the Japanese region;
 d. limit catches of bigeye and yellowfin within the Indonesian and Philippine fisheries.
CONSERvATION AND MANAgEMENT OPTIONS
The WCPFC can utilise a number of 
management options to meet these 
requirements. Each of these management 
options will support conservation and 
management objectives to varying degrees. 
However, each of these management options 
will also directly and indirectly impact upon 
the interests of WCPFC members to varying 
degrees. Key management options include:
 Seasonal closures. Some WCPFC members 
have supported the introduction of seasonal 
closures on the purse-seine fishery in order 
to reduce fishing effort, and therefore reduce 
fishing mortality of bigeye, yellowfin, and 
skipjack. The efficacy of this measure depends 
upon the degree to which the restriction truly 
removes the effort from the fishery. It is likely 
that fleets will respond through maximising 
non-fishing days (i.e., maintenance, transits, 
etc.) during seasonal closures in order 
to minimise reductions in fishing effort. 
Similarly, some fleets may attempt to transfer 
their fishing effort to other fisheries during 
seasonal closures. The application of a 
seasonal closure is likely to significantly affect 
those coastal States and processing interests 
that have few options to mitigate the impact 
of seasonal closures, thereby raising concerns 
that such measures may disproportionately 
affect developing coastal State parties.
 Area closures. Some WCPFC members have 
supported the introduction of area closures 
to reduce fishing effort and thereby reduce 
fishing mortality of bigeye, yellowfin, and 
skipjack. CMM 2008-01 currently includes 
provisions that close two high seas pockets 
to purse-seine fishing. As with seasonal 
closures, the efficacy of this measure depends 
upon the degree to which the restriction 
truly removes the effort from the fishery. 
It is likely that fleets will respond through 
migrating to other fishing zones such as EEZs, 
archipelagic waters, and other high seas. 
It appears that such high seas closures will 
only reduce fishing mortality if the effort is 
physically removed from the region, rather 
than simply transferring to another area. 
The application of an area closure is likely to 
impact most on hosting coastal States if the 
area occurred within an EEZ, and on fleets 
that have historically fished within the area 
to be closed. High seas closures are likely 
to benefit coastal States that will experience 
increased competition for access. The use 
of high seas closures in a mix of measures 
offers opportunities for the WCPFC to comply 
with Article 30 and avoid disproportionate 
transfers of conservation burden onto 
developing coastal States.
There has also been some suggestion to 
close or restrict longline fishing in spawning 
areas. This has been identified as a potentially 
effective option, in combination with other 
measures that implement area closures for 
purse-seine vessels and reduce effort.84 The 
application of such a measure is likely to 
impact most on host coastal States (if the 
closure were to occur inside an EEZ) and on 
fleets that have historically fished within the 
area to be closed. As noted above, high seas 
closures would benefit coastal States that will 
experience increased competition for access. 
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 Gear restrictions. CMM 2008-01 prescribes 
a three-month prohibition on the use of 
FADs by the purse-seine fishery. Recent 
assessments have indicated that this has 
been highly successful at reducing bigeye 
fishing mortality and has a strong impact 
on bigeye conservation. Assessments have 
also suggested that reductions in catches 
during the FAD closure may be offset by 
the larger average size of fish caught.85 
Further restrictions and limitations on the 
numbers of FADs that can be set are likely 
to impact significantly on some fleets that 
have historically used FADs more than others, 
and also on some coastal States where the 
use of FADs is higher than elsewhere. Other 
gear restrictions are also feasible, including 
restrictions on purse-seine mesh size, time 
restrictions on deployment or retrieval, types 
of hooks, etc.  
 Capacity limits. Some WCPFC members 
have strongly argued for the implementation 
of capacity limits to reduce effort, thereby 
reducing fishing mortality and increasing 
profitability. The WCPO tropical tuna fisheries 
suffer from overcapacity in the purse-seine 
fleet, and to a declining degree in the longline 
fleet. Reducing this capacity to a sustainable 
level would remove overfishing pressures and 
increase the economic efficiency of the fishing 
fleets, thereby potentially allowing for higher 
access fees to be paid to coastal States. 
However, capacity limits can be undermined 
by effort creep where vessels become faster, 
larger, more powerful, and more effective at 
catching fish, thereby effectively increasing 
capacity. Some members have strongly 
opposed capacity limits due to concerns that 
this would limit development opportunities 
for developing coastal States and impose 
a disproportionate conservation burden on 
developing State Parties. In addition, such 
reductions in capacity could limit demand for 
access and potentially negatively impact on 
coastal State access revenue.
 Catch and effort limits. CMM 2008-01 
implements catch limits on the longline 
fishery for bigeye and yellowfin and effort 
limits on the purse-seine fishery through 
the endorsement of the PNA vessel-day 
scheme, and the commitment to consider 
the development of a compatible vessel-
day scheme for the high seas and non-
PNA EEZs. These two management 
options provide a relatively transparent 
management mechanism for directly 
limiting fishing mortality. The efficacy of 
these management options depends on the 
consistency of the catch and effort limits with 
the scientific advice, and the monitoring of 
their implementation to avoid misreporting 
and discards. Any exemptions or special 
conditions must be considered during the 
formulation of the measure to ensure that 
these do not inflate the total catch or effort 
beyond the recommended fishing mortality. 
It is critical that adequate monitoring 
mechanisms are implemented to ensure 
that all catches and effort are accurately 
reported. The allocation of catch limits to 
national fleets and effort limits to areas has 
largely avoided problems inherent with 
‘Olympic’ limits, that motivate a race to fish, 
but further discussion is likely to be required 
to more fully allocate catches and effort for 
high seas fisheries. Such discussions can 
quickly become contentious given the lack 
of an agreed framework for the distribution 
of such limits, and the need to ensure that 
any allocation of limits does not result in 
a disproportionate burden of conservation 
onto developing State parties and territories. 
Other feasible effort limits can include further 
restrictions on transhipments-at-sea to reduce 
opportunities to continuously maintain fishing 
effort without interruption.
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DISCUSSION
In summary, there are a handful of States 
that control access to the WCPO tropical tuna 
fisheries and have the power to manage the 
interests involved. These core 14 States control 
the most productive waters and the vessels 
that fish in them. All of these States have a 
vested interest to some degree in the long-
term sustainability of some part of the fishery.
However, there is no straightforward interest 
among these 14 States to resolve the current 
overfishing of bigeye because the interests of 
this group in bigeye are less influential due to 
complications from three factors. 
First, each of these States has a dominant or 
at least strong interest in purse-seine fisheries 
for skipjack that complicates any interest 
in conserving bigeye. In addition, bigeye is 
simply worth less in overall value (across 
the WCPO tropical tuna fisheries) with fewer 
States holding an immediate interest in its 
conservation. 
Second, longline fishers have historically 
reported much of their bigeye catch as 
originating from the high seas. In 2010, 87% of 
all WCPO tuna catches were taken from within 
waters under national jurisdiction, yet only 60% 
of longline fishing for bigeye was reported as 
occurring in these waters.86 Given that there 
appears to be no biological or oceanographic 
reason for this difference, it appears reasonable 
to assume that longline activities were focused 
more heavily on the high seas to reduce the 
costs of paying license fees to coastal States. 
Regardless of whether these reports accurately 
reflect the location of the fishing activity,87 the 
effect of this high seas focus is that there is 
very little incentive for coastal States to bear a 
significant conservation burden for bigeye. 
It appears that the weak position of bigeye, 
and the unwillingness of members to 
compromise their interests, are key factors 
in the WCPFC’s failure to adopt a sufficiently 
strong conservation and management 
measures. Delegations have stated that 
compromises are required and that an 
equitable approach should be adopted.88 
When negotiations begin in earnest, however, 
it appears that this spirit of compromise and 
equitable distribution is rarely applied. 
In practice, individual WCPFC members have 
generally demonstrated a desire to distribute 
the burden of conservation elsewhere. For 
example, in 2008 the United States proposed 
that measures should be applied to EEZs 
and archipelagic waters, while arguing for 
special treatment for its purse-seine fleet.89 
The Americans won special treatment for 
their fleet and subsequently increased the 
size of their purse-seine fishing fleet to a 
level far above their reported level of purse-
seine effort between 2001 and 2004. This 
was subsequently identified in 2009 as a key 
reason for the ineffectiveness of CMM 2008-
01.90 In response, delegations from Japan, 
China, Chinese Taipei, South Korea, and the 
Philippines complained in 2009 that the U.S. 
special treatment was unfair and that they 
were not prepared to accept any further burden 
of conservation on their longline interests 
unless this unfair treatment was addressed.91
Japan has demonstrated similar behaviour 
on previous proposals for capacity limits that 
would entrench Japan’s historically high levels 
of fishing effort and place the majority of the 
conservation burden on developing States 
and new entrants by limiting their capacity at 
historically low levels.92
Small island developing coastal States have 
demonstrated such behaviour with their drive to 
close high seas pockets and limit the application 
of measures to their EEZs and archipelagic 
waters. These States oppose any seasonal 
closure to purse-seine fishing across the entire 
WCPO and have successfully argued that 
CCM 2008-01 should incorporate their existing 
coastal State management arrangements for 
tuna and apply compatible measures to the 
high seas.93 
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The Philippines and some other DWFNs 
attempted to protect their interests in high 
seas fisheries by opposing high seas closures 
in 2008, 2009, and 2010.94 This was particularly 
problematic for the Philippines due to the 
significant interests of its fishing fleets that fish 
both within its EEZ and in neighbouring high 
seas pockets.
South Korea has favoured measures that 
prohibit or heavily restrict the use of FADs 
over seasonal closures that would simply shut 
down the entire purse-seine fishery for a period 
of time.95 This is consistent with their fleet’s 
minimal use of FADs and their strong interest 
in purse-seine fisheries. On the other side of 
FAD negotiations, the European Union and 
other States have favoured seasonal closures 
over FAD prohibitions. This is consistent with 
their high usage of FADs. In addition, the 2010 
proposal by the European Union to remove high 
seas closures and apply a purse-seine closure 
across the entire Convention Area is consistent 
with their dominant interests as a DWFN flag 
State (the European Union is not responsible 
for any coastal waters within the WCPO).
The reluctance shown by WCPFC members to 
compromise their purse-seine interests has also 
been demonstrated by Asian DWFNs and the 
United States in regard to their longline fleets. 
Although longline interests are not as influential 
as purse-seine interests, they are nevertheless 
moderate to strong within the Asian DWFNs, 
and significant within the U.S. EEZ surrounding 
Hawaii. For example, the United States 
successfully negotiated special conditions in 
2008 that protected its longline bigeye interests 
and significantly reduced the conservation 
burden on U.S. longline interests. 
After blocking longline reductions in 2007, 
Asian DWFNs reluctantly accepted that longline 
catch should be reduced by 30% in CMM 
2008-01.96 Since then, they have opposed any 
further reductions in longline catch and argued 
that they will not compromise further until 
they believe that the burden of conservation is 
distributed more evenly.97
Given current levels of overfishing, a 
sustainable solution for bigeye will require that 
some or all States agree to compromise their 
interests and carry some of the conservation 
burden. This raises important questions 
that are fundamental to conservation and 
management negotiations.
For example, given that the longline fishery will 
benefit from conservation reductions in bigeye 
mortality, should those States with significant 
interests in longline fisheries bear a greater 
share of the conservation burden than those 
States with minimal interests in bigeye longline 
fisheries that will receive no direct benefit from 
reductions in bigeye mortality?
When considering the distribution of the 
conservation burden, should the WCPFC value 
the shared nature of common rights to high 
seas fisheries less than the exclusive nature 
of sovereign rights over fisheries within EEZs? 
How might these rights be weighed against the 
absolute sovereignty that coastal States hold 
over fisheries within their archipelagic waters or 
territorial seas? Does the immobility of a coastal 
State’s rights over its EEZ grant it greater 
consideration compared to the flexibility of a 
DWFN’s rights? (A distant water fishing vessel 
is highly mobile and can relocate if overfishing 
in one region reduces a highly migratory 
stock below profitable levels. In contrast, a 
coastal State is vulnerable to overfishing in 
neighbouring EEZs and adjacent high seas and 
cannot move its EEZ to another region if stocks 
decline below profitable levels).
When considering matters of food security 
and the impact of conservation reductions, 
how should the WCPFC consider the 
diversity and choices of food enjoyed by 
distant markets compared to the limited 
options available to artisanal communities 
in coastal developing States? Should a 
consumer of luxury sashimi in New York or 
Tokyo be given equal weight to an artisanal 
community in Kiribati or the Philippines?
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When considering how to reduce effort or 
catches of fishing fleets, should a historically 
high level of catch and fishing activity be 
prioritised, or penalised if it is considered more 
equitable to share benefits in turn? How should 
the development aspirations of developing 
States be recognised in practice?
The WCPFC does not currently discuss these 
questions, nor does it study the interests 
of its members, or the impact of proposed 
measures on these interests. Instead, the 
WCPFC addresses deeply political and 
economic arguments within a conservation 
science framework. This scientific framework 
then becomes politicized as members propose 
conservation arguments for measures that 
best protect their own interests, and refute 
conservation arguments for measures that 
compromise their interests. Ultimately, this 
undermines the conservation science while still 
leaving these political and economic questions 
unanswered. 
CONCLUSION
Given the collective failure of WCPFC 
members to address overfishing of bigeye, 
it is arguable that overfishing will continue 
until the WCPFC negotiates a measure that 
transparently recognises the benefits and 
costs, and equitably distributes the burden 
of conservation in a manner consistent with 
the WCPF Convention. To date, the WCPFC 
has failed to successfully resolve the political 
aspects of this problem, and consequently, 
the members have proved to be unwilling to 
compromise their interests.
It is unlikely that the WCPFC will be able to 
develop and negotiate such a response across 
its plenary table without first agreeing on 
a conceptual framework that provides for 
differential application of measures to the 
degree necessary to recognise the divergent 
interests while allowing for sufficient reductions 
in fishing mortality. Consequently, this paper 
suggests that a new ‘discussion’ is required 
that allows for the development of such a 
conceptual framework. This discussion would 
move beyond the conceptual level of rights-
based models and provide the concrete steps 
that explicitly determine what conservation 
burden each State would carry depending on  
its national characteristics.
The WCPFC is the only regional institution with 
a mandate to regulate all WCPO tuna fisheries 
across their entire range and ensure their 
long-term conservation and sustainable use.98 
However, despite this mandate, the WCPFC 
has repeatedly failed to adopt conservation 
and management measures that are sufficient 
to meet its own Scientific Committee’s 
recommendations. 
In 2008, the WCPFC celebrated significant 
achievements in negotiating a contentious 
conservation measure that broke new ground. 
In 2012, it will need to build significantly on 
these precedents and expand the application 
of the conservation measure so that it fully 
implements the requisite reductions in fishing 
mortality and overall effort.99
“The decisions that we arrive at in order to achieve the long-term goal of sustained 
utilization of the region’s tuna resources will involve concessions from all those 
currently involved in the fishery. This is a fact of the situation. If the current levels of 
fishing are excessive and are not sustainable, steps will need to be taken to reduce 
the fishing effort in a way that does not unfairly disadvantage anyone that has a 
demonstrated long-term and dependent interest in the fishery.”100
His Excellency Joseph J. Urusemal 
President of Federated States of Micronesia, 2003 to 2007
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